


















Due	 to	 the	 disbandment	 of	 the	 Comintern	 in	 1943,	 historians	 of	 the	 international	
communist	movement	with	access	to	Russian	documents	also	paid	less	attention	to	1943-44	
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Tito’s	 biography.	 In	 this	 context,	 more	 coverage	 has	 been	 given	 to	 events	 post-Teheran,	
stressing	that	Moscow’s	readiness	to	support	Tito	increased	significantly	once	Stalin	realised	
that	this	did	not	put	him	on	a	collision	course	with	the	British.5	But	this	focus	upon	Tito	means	
that	 the	 extent	 of	 Soviet	 involvement	has	 been	 largely	 neglected,	 as	 also	 internal	 debate	
within	 the	 Soviet	 camp,	 which	 shaped	 the	 formulation	 of	 Soviet	 policy	 during	 the	 entire	
course	of	the	war.		
	



























The	 fire	 of	 resistance	 swept	 through	 Yugoslavia	 after	 the	 country	was	 invaded	by	 the	
Germans	in	April	1941.	Repression	at	the	hands	of	the	nominally	independent	State	of	Croatia	
established	by	the	Germans	caused	the	first	spontaneous	insurrection	of	the	Serbs,	who	acted	
largely	 in	 self-defence	and	with	 little	 coordination	between	disparate	 groups	of	 rebels.	 In	
Serbia,	 by	 contrast,	 the	 resistance	 found	 a	 nucleus	 of	 organization	 developing	 around	
Dragoljub	Mihailović	and	a	group	of	Serbian	officers	who	refused	to	accept	the	surrender.	The	
British,	who	 at	 that	 point	were	 short	 of	 good	 news,	 hailed	Mihailović	 as	 the	 hero	 of	 the	
European	resistance	and	inflated	his	accomplishments	‘to	legendary	proportions’.6	
In	Yugoslavia,	as	everywhere	across	Europe,	the	communists	joined	the	resistance	only	















1975),	 J.	 Tomasevich,	The	Chetniks	 (Stanford,	CA	1975).	The	development	of	 the	Chetnik-Partisan	conflict	 in	














quickly	 repel	 the	 German	 attack	 and	 advance	 through	 the	 Balkans,	 in	 September	 Tito	
established	his	headquarters	in	the	city	of	Užice,	in	western	Serbia.	Here	he	set	up	a	system	
of	 government	 under	 the	 strict	 control	 of	 the	 party,	 destroying	 tax	 and	 land	 records,	
introducing	communist	symbols	and	getting	rid	of	real	or	imaginary	“enemies	of	the	people”.	
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 November,	 the	 Partisans	 celebrated	 the	 anniversary	 of	 the	 October	
Revolution,	and	in	22	December,	the	day	of	Stalin’s	birthday,	created	the	first	“proletarian	






starting	 from	 September,	 pushed	Molotov	 to	 send	military	 supplies	 to	 Yugoslavia.12	 	 The	
Comintern,	which	at	that	point	had	no	connections	with	the	Greek	communist	party,	was	also	





















mission	 to	 Mihailović	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 British,14	 were	 unsure	 about	 what	 was	
happening	in	the	country.	At	the	end	of	November	the	secretary	of	the	Comintern,	Dimitrov,	
asked	Tito	who	was	leading	the	Chetniks	and	which	relation	did	they	have	with	the	Partisans.15	
When	 Tito	 replied	 that	 they	 were	 just	 collaborators	 of	 the	 Germans,	 Moscow	 appeared	
unconvinced,	suspecting	that	it	was	Tito	who	was	not	doing	enough	to	achieve	collaboration	
with	other	antifascist	forces.	A	few	months	later	Dimitrov	was	still	insisting	to	Tito	that	it	was	




the	 possibility	 for	 the	 Soviets	 to	 appease	 the	 British	 by	 publicly	 pushing	 Tito	 towards	 a	
conciliatory	 course	 was	 limited,	 paradoxically,	 by	 Moscow’s	 claim	 that	 the	 European	
communist	 parties	 were	 not	 the	 “long	 arm”	 of	 Moscow.17	 When,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
December	 1941,	 the	 British	 incorrectly	 notified	 them	 that	 the	 Chetniks	 had	 reached	 an	










York,	NY	1988),	 194-204.	 See	also	M.	Wheeler,	 ‘Resistance	 from	Abroad.	Anglo-Soviet	 Efforst	 to	Coordinate	






the	 Comintern	 might	 represent	 an	 obstacle	 both	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 parties	 and	 for	 Moscow’s	
international	 relations,	 and	 started	discussing	 the	 advisability	 of	 disbanding	 it.	 See	Banac	 (ed.)	The	Diary	 of	
Georgi	Dimitrov,	20.4.1941,	155-56	and	Firsov,	Klehr,	and	Haynes,	Secret	Cables	of	the	Comintern,	238-39.	














was,	 at	 its	 roots,	 strategic,	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 eternal	 debate	 inside	 the	 international	






























Comintern,25	Dimitrov	delivered	a	 lesson	 in	popular-front	 tactics	 to	Tito.	The	Partisans,	he	
explained,	were	right	to	expose	the	activities	of	the	Chetniks,	but	this	should	not	be	presented	
as	an	attack	on	the	Yugoslav	government,	but	rather	as	an	appeal	to	it,	‘emphasizing	that	the	
fighting	 Yugoslav	 patriots	 are	 entitled	 to	 expect	 that	 government’s	 support’.	 Part	 of	 the	
Chetniks,	he	argued,	should	be	won	over,	others	neutralized	and	only	 ‘the	most	malicious	
part	of	 them’	destroyed	 ‘without	mercy’.	He	believed	 that	 the	campaign	against	 the	class	
enemy	should	be	conducted	in	the	name	of	unity,	without	giving	the	impression	that	it	was	
party	oriented.	He	therefore	considered	 it	expedient	 to	organize	some	form	of	appeal	 ‘by	
well-known	Yugoslav	public	figures	and	politicians	against	collaborators	and	in	favour	of	the	
Part[isan]	people’s	liberation	army’,	and	possibly	also	to	set	up	a	‘national	committee	for	aid	
for	 the	Yugoslav	people’s	war	of	 liberation’	with	the	participation	of	 ‘well-known	patriotic	












SSSR	 pri	 Soiuznykh	 Pravitel’stvakh	 v	 Londone	 A.E.	 Bogomolovym,	 16.5.1942	 and	 Iz	 Doneseniia	 Posla	 SSSR	 v	
Velikobritanii	I.M.	Maiskogo	v	NKID	SSSR,	28.7.1942,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	117-18	and	127.	






























































with	 the	 Partisans.	 Various	 options	 were	 considered,	 including	 proposing	 to	 Tito	 an	





























also	 contained	 a	 cautious	 expression	 of	 support	 for	 the	 partisan	 movement	 ‘which	
encompassed	 the	 very	 broadest	 sectors	 of	 the	 population	 irrespective	 of	 political	
orientation’.	 However,	 the	 document	 continued,	 the	 Soviet	 government	 did	 not	 wish	 to	
interfere	in	internal	problems	that	needed	to	be	sorted	out	by	the	Yugoslav	government.	It	
denied	 that	 it	 was	 supporting	 the	 Partisans	 against	 Mihailović	 or	 producing	 propaganda	
against	him.	A	second	version	of	 the	document,	prepared	on	4	April,	dropped	 the	call	 for	






















Moscow’s	paralysis	 lifted	at	 the	end	of	1943,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 transition	 in	Soviet	






organization	 secretly	 headed	 by	Dimitrov	which	was	 in	 charge	 of	 “special	 institutes”	 that	






periods	 of	 leave	 due	 to	 illness,	 was	 progressively	 side-lined,	 while	 Stalin	 and	 Molotov	
personally	 directed	 the	 communist	 parties	 either	 through	 personal	 meetings	 with	 their	
leaders	or	through	the	missions	dispatched	by	Soviet	military	intelligence.	

















pro-Mihailović	 and	 one	 pro-Tito,	 but	 that	 the	 military	 circles	 were	 unhappy	 with	 British	
support	 for	 the	 former.	 Tito	quickly	 passed	 this	 information	 to	Dimitrov,	 adding	 that	 ‘the	





































a	 very	 limited	 and	 uncertain	 means	 of	 contact.’51	 A	 request	 from	 Manuil’skii	 to	 send	
substantial	military	help	to	Tito	now	that	the	military	situation	made	it	technically	possible	
was	also	kept	on	hold.	52	Moscow	was	clearly	waiting	to	see	how	the	situation	developed.		




his	 confidence	 and	 leading	 him	 into	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 king.	 At	 Tehran,	 the	 British	
informed	Moscow	that	they	intended	to	provide	military	support	to	Tito	and	dropped	their	
request	 for	assistance	 in	brokering	a	deal	between	him	and	Mihailović.	Soviet	 intelligence	
confirmed	 the	 British	 shift	 towards	 Tito,	 providing	 Moscow	 with	 London’s	 confidential	
documents	on	the	matter.53	The	question	of	the	Soviet	mission	was	discussed	again.	Since	the	
















54	Zapis’	 besedy	 tov.	Molotova	 s	 Idenom	 i	Gopkinsom	vo	Vremia	 Zavtraka	 v	Angliiskoi	Missii	 v	 Tegerane.	 30	
Noiabria	 1943	 goda,	 in	 O.A.	 Rzheshevskii	 (ed.)	 Stalin	 i	 Cherchill':	 Vstrechi.	 Besedy.	 Diskussii:	 Dokumenty,	













relations	 with	 the	 partisans,	 and	 asked	 for	 Soviet	 assistance	 in	 brokering	 an	 agreement	
between	Tito	and	the	king.58	The	following	day	the	Soviet	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	issued	a	
note	praising	the	AVNOJ’s	decisions.	The	wording	of	the	note	made	it	clear	that	the	new	policy	
had	 originated	 in	 the	Western	 field,	 and	 that	Moscow	was	merely	 following	 up	 a	 British	
initiative.	The	crucial	passage,	which	was	rewritten	several	times,	stated	that	the	events	in	
Yugoslavia	had	‘already	met	sympathetic	responses	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	in	the	US’	and	
in	 announcing	 the	 arrival	 of	 a	 Soviet	Mission	 it	was	 stressed	 that	 the	 British	 had	 already	
established	their	mission	in	the	field.59	The	Soviet	reply	to	the	British	note	of	13	December	
was	also	carefully	worded	to	keep	the	Soviets’	hands	free.	Assurances	that	the	Soviet	mission	




put	 in	 place	 on	 22	 December,	 when	 the	 government	 in	 Moscow	 communicated	 to	 the	
																																																						
56	Radiogramma	TsK	KPIu	G.	Dimitrovu,	30.11.1943,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	206.		
57	 Clissold	 (ed.)	 Yugoslavia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 27.	 The	 relevance	 of	 this	 episode	 is	 disputed	 by	 Jukic,	
Uncommon	Cause,	320-26.		













Western	 Allies	 to	 the	 Yugoslav	 delegation	 that	 was	 sent	 to	 Cairo	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
December.	 Dimitrov	 agreed	 with	 Tito	 that	 he	 should	 not	 push	 for	 recognition	 of	 the	
committee	by	the	Western	Allies	and	that	he	should	remain	firm	in	his	demand	to	postpone	
the	issue	of	the	position	of	the	king	until	after	the	war.	On	the	issue	of	propaganda	against	










the	 scenes,	 they	were	 overturning	 one	 of	 the	 key	 features	 of	 the	 popular	 front	 strategy	
















of	 reasons	 to	 refuse	 the	deal	 the	matter	was	 serious	 enough	 to	 ask	 the	opinion	of	 Stalin	
himself.65	Tito,	who	was	used	to	being	reprimanded	by	Moscow	over	his	direct	confrontations	
with	 the	 Government-in-exile,	 this	 time	 received	 a	 different	 response.	 Though	 Dimitrov,	
Stalin	and	Molotov	let	him	know	that	he	should	reply	to	‘the	Englishman’	that	he	too	favoured	
the	 unity	 of	 the	 Yugoslavs	 and	 that,	 for	 this	 reason,	 the	 government-in-exile,	 including	
Mihailović,	should	be	eliminated,	the	AVNOJ	recognized	as	the	sole	government	of	Yugoslavia	








reached	an	 impasse.	Lacking	a	political	solution,	 it	was	clear	 to	everybody	that	 the	crucial	
factor	 for	 the	 future	of	Yugoslavia	was	 the	balance	of	 forces	 in	 the	 field	and	especially	 in	
Serbia	where	Mihailović	was	still	strong	and	the	Partisans	did	not	have	a	significant	presence.		
At	 the	 end	 of	 February,	 the	 possibility	 of	 Soviet	 action	 in	 Yugoslavia	 substantially	
increased	with	the	arrival	of	the	Soviet	military	mission.	The	mission,	led	by	the	Lieutenant-
General	of	the	military	intelligence,	Nikolai	Korneev,	was	composed	of	21	members,	including	
at	 least	 two	members	of	 the	KGB,	whose	 task	was	 to	 report,	 among	other	 things,	on	 the	
intentions	 of	 the	 British	 and	 the	 Americans	 in	 Yugoslavia.	 At	 Tito’s	 request,	 in	 April	 an	
additional	group	of	KGB	agents	was	dispatched	to	train	the	partisans	in	the	intelligence	field.69	
In	 the	 following	months,	 the	ranks	of	 the	mission	were	 further	 increased,	and	by	October	
																																																						
65	Rasshifrovannaia	Telegramma	iz	Iugoslavii,	8.2.1944,	in	RGASPI,	f.	82,	o.	2,	d.	1369,	ll.	56-57.	
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time	 a	 direct	 channel	 of	 communication	 between	 Tito	 and	 the	 Soviet	 leadership	 when	
Moscow	wanted	to	be	sure	that	the	situation	was	developing	in	line	with	its	foreign	policy.			
Completing	the	process	of	side-lining	Dimitrov	which	had	started	with	the	disbandment	
of	 the	 Comintern,	 Tito	was	 informed	 that	 from	April	 he	 could	 communicate	 directly	with	





ally	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	Bulgaria	an	enemy,	and	that	even	 if	 the	situation	changed	 in	
Bulgaria	they	wanted	Yugoslavia	to	be	their	‘principal	support	in	South-eastern	Europe’.	The	
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different	 views	 on	 how	 to	 establish	 relations	with	 Tito.	 In	 November	 1944,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Soviet	military	
intelligence	Ivan	Il’ichev	sharply	attacked	Korneev,	claiming	that	although	at	the	end	of	October	he	had	been	
instructed	to	act	otherwise	by	Molotov,	he	was	maintaining	an	obliging	attitude	towards	Tito,	and	had	turned	











operations	 claimed,	 Korneev	 had	 an	 inadequate	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 delivery	 of	
supplies	worked,	and	had	submitted	a	plan	with	dropping	points	extending	across	500	km,	
‘which	would	be	across	the	entire	country’.78	In	one	instance,	a	plane	had	been	accidentally	











‘extreme	 caution	 and	 tact	 so	 as	 not	 to	 provoke	 complains	 that	we	 are	 interfering	 in	 the	
internal	 affairs	 of	 Yugoslavia	 or	 that	 we	 are	 not	 loyal	 to	 the	 allies’.81	 The	 same	 caution	
encouraged	Moscow	to	reject	the	option	to	sever	relations	with	the	Yugoslav	government-in-
exile,	which	had	been	contemplated	in	the	first	months	of	the	year.82	In	April,	meeting	Djilas	


























































found	 the	 occasion	 propitious	 for	 a	meeting	with	 the	 new	 Yugoslav	 prime	minister,	 Ivan		
Šubašić.	Molotov	was	informed	by	the	British	of	the	meeting,	but	before	replying	rushed	to	
ask	 Tito’s	 opinion	 and	 plans.	 Then,	 he	 put	 all	Moscow’s	might	 into	 the	 negotiations	 and	
handed	 to	 Korneev	 a	 letter	 addressed	 to	 Šubašić,	 in	 which	 they	 promised	 to	 support	 a	






















Komissara	 Inostrannykh	 Del	 SSSR	 V.M.	Molotova	 Prem’er-Ministru	 Iugoslavkogo	 Pravitel’stva	 v	 Emigratsii	 I.	
Shubashichu,	15.6.1944,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	270.	



















the	pressure	 from	the	British’,	who	were	plotting	with	Mihailović	 to	 strip	Serbia	 from	the	
AVNOJ.	Tito	also	asked	for	the	Red	Army	to	advance	through	Romania	into	south	and	central	
Serbia	 to	 participate	with	 the	 Partisan	 divisions	 assisting	 in	 the	 liberation	 of	 Belgrade.	 In	
September,	he	reiterated	the	demand	directly	to	Moscow,	where	at	his	own	request	he	had	
flown	 to	meet	 Stalin	 in	 secret.	 These	measures,	 he	 argued,	 ‘will	 resolve	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
Balkans’.96		
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RGASPI,	f.	82,	o.	2,	d.	1371,	ll.	45-63.	
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Soviet	 troops	 entered	 Yugoslavia	 at	 the	 end	 of	 September	 under	 orders	 to	 fight	 the	
Germans	and	the	‘reactionary	forces	of	Yugoslavia	of	Nedić	and	Mihailović’.97	The	Soviets	did	



















that	 the	disagreement	with	 the	Yugoslavs	over	 the	nature	of	 the	war	 in	1941-1943	never	
really	brought	into	question	the	Soviets’	recognition	of	the	preeminent	role	played	by	Tito	
amongst	 the	neighbour	parties.	The	example	of	Yugoslavia,	however,	also	shows	 that	 this	
























had	 ‘nursed	a	 viper’.100	 The	Soviets	were	also	able	 convincingly	 to	deny	until	 the	end	 the	
extent	of	their	involvement	with	the	Yugoslav	communist	movement,	thus	avoiding	the	risk	
that,	if	anything	went	wrong,	the	situation	could	be	ascribed	to	them.	In	all	this,	they	provided	
at	the	crucial	moment	the	military,	financial	and	diplomatic	support	that	the	Partisans	needed	
to	defeat	their	internal	enemies	and	to	gain	credibility	in	the	international	area.	Tito	played	
his	cards	well,	paying	lip	service	to	the	Soviets	when	needed	and	continuing	to	advance	his	
cause	step	by	step	whilst	maintaining	their	support.		
The	seeds	for	further	conflicts,	however,	had	been	planted.	Paradoxically,	by	pushing	Tito	
to	widen	his	popular	base	in	Yugoslavia	after	1942,	the	Soviets	had	established	him	as	the	
leader	of	a	communist	state	that	was	now	challenging	Moscow’s	supremacy.	Created	by	Stalin	
and	nursed	by	Churchill,	‘the	viper’	Tito	was	now	ready	to	bite	eastward.	Exacerbated	by	Tito’s	
attempt	to	impose	his	leadership	on	the	other	‘popular	democracies’	in	the	Balkans	after	the	
war,	the	conflict	between	the	two	leaders	of	the	communist	movements	eventually	became	
unmanageable,	and	in	1948	led	to	the	most	serious	split	in	the	communist	world.	
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